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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., a corporation, as Executor of 
the ESTATE OF JAMES C. DEMI-
RIS, Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
IPHEGENIA P. DEMIRIS, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
MARGARETA DEMIRIS PAPACAS-
TAS, CONSTANTINO C. DEMIRIS, 
ATHANASIOS DEMIRIS, ·PETER 
DEMIRIS and JOHN DEMIRIS, 
Intervenors and Appellants. l. 
Case No. 
8982 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT AND 
ANSWER BRIEF OF CROSS RESPONDENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In view of the complex and difficult nature of this case, 
appellants feel obliged to call the court's attention to a few 
of the numerous instances of inexact reporting by respondent 
of the testimony of some of the witnesses, notwithstanding the 
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existence of the typewritten record in this court. The record, 
. ., 
we submit, when compared with respondent's purported sum-
mation of the facts calls to mind Mark Twain's admonition 
that the "difference between the right word and .the word that 
will do is the difference between the lightning and the lightning 
bug." 
For simplification in this brief,· we will also refer to the 
transcript under the record page number thereof as used· by 
the respondent rather than the transcript page number that 
we used in our first brief. All italics and other emphasis herein 
are ours. 
Respondent's Brief, page 23: "It may be just coin-
cidence that John would see his brother down town 
every day in November and would note an unusual 
circumstance in connection with his memory on No-
vember 26th, the day he found out about Jim's will." 
Actual Testimony: There is no evidence justifying 
the conclusion that John Demiris knew that he was 
named in the will on November 26th or at any other 
time prior to probate. However, it is difficult to see 
wherein a sinister motive may be ascribed to John's 
wanting his brother to see a doctor on that date even 
if he did have such knowledge. 
Respondent's Brief, page 12: "For two months be-
fore Jim went to the hospital she had a chance to see 
him and talked to him many times since he lived in 
the apartment next door (R. 381), and they talked 
in Greek all of the time." · 
Actual Testimony: Mrs. Demas did not observe Jim 
for two months, for it was stipulated that she did not 
move into the apartment until November 12 (R. 393, 
394) only five weeks prior to Jim's hospitalization. 
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Respondent's Brief, page 17: "The doctor (Dr. 
Powell) could not remember any specific history given 
to him by the wife. . . . " 
Actual Testimony: The history was given by John 
and Mrs. Demiris, both of them present and supplying 
portions; the doctor could not remember which specific 
information was given by which person. However, it 
is clear that there was no disagreement between them 
as to when the illness began or how it progressed. "It 
was taken in their joint presence . . . by myself asking 
questions . . . and everyone present, except the patient, 
supplied some information, and the sum of that in-
formation was noted by me . . . " (R. 130) . 
Respondent's Brief, pages 18 and 19: If Dr. Powell 
had had any knowledge of the observations of lay 
witnesses, such observations "would certainly alter his 
opinion." 
Actual Testimony: "All facts ... would have been 
taken into consideration, of course, and depending 
on how I felt about those facts . . . I would certainly 
have considered them and they might alter my opin-
ion.'' (R. 149). 
Respondent's Brief, page 19 (26, 27): "Dr. Powell 
acknowledged that the best evidence concerning the 
competency of Mr. Demiris would lie in observations 
of his mental and physical activities by others in a 
period in which the deterioration occurred; and this 
does not necessarily require medical observation but 
could be observation by those living with him or asso-
ciating with him and those with whom he did business." 
Actual Testimony: None of the respondent's wit-
nesses qualified in such close association except Mrs. 
Demiris who contributed the history which included 
the report of serious illness for. at least three weeks 
prior to December 18. Both Mrs. Demiris and John 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Demiris were closely questioned by Dr. Powell in tak-
ing the history for purposes of treatment. In relation 
to reliance upon lay witnesses, Dr. Powell stated that 
he would have to interrogate them: "I would want 
to know the details of their observations, and I would 
prefer to question the witnesses as I did the family 
in taking the history. In other words, I wouldn't 
simply take what they said unqualifiedly." (R. 156). 
Respondent's Brief, page 26: The statement that Dr. 
Howard found Mr. Demiris rational, implying com-
petent, on December 1st, is misleading. 
Actual Testimony: It is clear that Dr. Howard meant 
only that Mr. Demiris was not indulging in grossly 
abnormal behavior. He further stated that Mr. Demiris 
"did not appear to me to answer or comprehend ques-
tions that were given to him." (R. 165, 166). 
Respondent's Brief, page 26: Dr. Powell could only 
''speculate" as to Jim's condition prior to December 
18th. 
Actual Testimony: Dr. Powell actually testified "I 
feel that I could ... express a reasonably certain medi-
cal opinion." (R. 150). 
Respondent's Brief, page 26: The respondent asserts 
that the doctor noted the entire condition of senile 
deterioration could have occurred within a few days. 
Actual Testimony: In fact, the doctor, under cross-
examination, stated that it was possible (i.e. it was 
not impossible (R. 155) that the condition could have 
occurred within a few days. But this does not detract 
from his considered medical opinion based not only 
upon his observations but also upon the history he 
obtained, that Mr. Demiris was not competent on 
December 5th. 
Respondent's Brief, page 27: Respondent states: "Dr. 
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Powell while indicating that there could have been 
symptoms of deterioration existing from one to four 
months prior to December 18,1956, admitted that it 
is entirely possible that the deterioration could be very 
rapid." 
Actual Testimony: Dr. Powell stated clearly and un-
equivocally, "I think it is improbable and medically 
quite unlikely that the patient had been competent 
within a period of one to four months prior to the time 
I saw him." (R. 150). He at no time stated that it 
was entirely possible that the deterioration could be 
very rapid, but merely acknowledged that this type of 
condition could have occurred within a few days. · 
Respondent's Brief, page 28: Respondent claims that 
Dr. Callaghan found Jim very responsive. 
Actual Testimony: Dr. Callaghan, an eye, ear, nose 
and throat specialist, merely noted nothing unusual 
in Jim's behavior (R. 279). He admitted that he had 
never seen Jim prior to this visit. 
Respondent's Brief, page 73: In her cross appeal 
respondent states: "Where Mr. Demir is said if he 
shoudl get sick or something, he wanted his wife to 
have the money, it would seem to be an undue limita-
tion to say that under the circumstances he only intended 
for her to get the money so long as he was sick, but 
not if he passed away." 
Actual Testimony: Floyd Long, trust officer at the 
bank, testified that Mr. Demiris actually said, "He 
said he would like her to be able to cash the check, in 
case he was sick or something she could cash it and have 
some money." There was no other testimony that Mr. 
Demiris wanted' his wife to have the money. 
Respondent's Brief, pages 3 7, 38: "Jim must have 
become suspicious of Peter and John after November 
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26 because he refused to talk with Peter and John 
thereafter." 
Actual Testimony: There is no evidence that Jim 
refused to talk with Peter and John. The evidence 
showed that he was withdrawn and uncommunicative 
during this period. 
Responden-ts Brief, page 38: "Mr. Demiris, while 
he and defendant were visiting Mrs. Tsimpoukis on 
December 7th, 1956 told Mrs. Tsimpoukis that he went 
to the bank and changed the books." 
Actual T estimonys Mrs. Tsimpoukis said "One of 
them said he went to the bank and changed the books" 
but she wasn't sure whether it was Jim Demiris or the 
defendant." (R. 358, 367). If such was actually said, 
the testimony indicates it was the respondent rather 
than her husband. 
POINTS I and II 
All of the evidence respecting the condition, conduct 
and acvtivities of James C. Demiris is consistent with the 
testimony of Dr. Chester Powell, who attended Mr. Demiris 
in his last illness and who stated that in his opinion, based 
upon reasonable medical certainty, the deceased, Jim Demiris, 
had been incompetent to transact his business at the time he 
purportedly gave possession of his estate to the respondent, 
his wife. The testimony of the appellants' witnesses that Jim 
Demiris seemed changed, nervous, dull, withdrawn, with fail-
ing memory, etc., from September on substantiate the doctor's 
diagnosis completely, and the testimony of respondent's wit-
nesses is not incompatible with such diagnosis and the symptoms 
of the illness as described by Dr. Powell. 
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The doctor testified that the onslaught of the illness 
would make the patient wary of personal contacts and that he 
would compensate for his diminishing mental powers by auto-
matic responses, silence, and by avoiding social contacts. He 
testified that "semi-strangers or mere acquaintances .meeting 
on the street might notice nothing. Relatives or people who 
had known the individual for sometime, particular! y if they 
spent any time with him, might or might not notice something 
in the earlier phases" (R. 139). It thus seems scarcely necessary 
to reiterate the lack of opportunity for reliable observation 
on the part of some of the respondent's witnesses such as the 
insurance salesman who greeted the couple on the street or 
Mr. Long, who talked briefly with Mr. Demiris in English, 
while Mrs. Demiris gave her husband instructions in Greek. 
It is obvious too that there was little diagnostic significance in 
Mrs. O'Connell's assertion that Mr. Demiris always recognized 
her, while admitting that he appeared to be sick and just 
seemed to give up a couple or three weeks before he went 
to the hospital on December 21, 1956. 
Mrs. Tsimpoukis was a close friend of Mrs. Demiris, 
who believed Mrs. Demiris deserved the money and so testified; 
her three visits with the deceased during this period,· although 
of a slightly longer duration than the contact of the respond-
ent's other witnesses, scarcely qualify as "close association," 
which Dr. Powell testified as essential to adequate and accurate 
observation (R. 156). The fact that Jim Demiris could recog-
nize someone and appear to converse normally with them even 
though legally incompetent is clearly borne out by Mrs. 
Tsimpoukis' testimony that when she visited Jim on December 
19 or 20 he recognized her, conversed with her and didn't 
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seem different, except that he was seeing people outside his 
window when there weren't any people there (R. 368-369). 
This visit was after Dr. Powell's extensive examination of 
the deceased, Jim Demiris, on December 18th when Dr. Powell 
found him "incompetent for all ordinary activities of life," 
(R. 145) and "unable ... to exercise any degree of judgment" 
(R. 146). 
The obvious lack of time and ability to assess the de-
ceased's mental condition is true also of Mrs. Bombas, who 
spoke mostly to Mrs. Demiris during her visits with them, 
and the same is true of Mrs. Tiano. Jim Demiris was only one 
of some 25 or so patients that Dr. Callaghan saw on November 
28, 1956. The doctor was only treating him for an eye con-
dition and was seeing him for the first time. It is submitted 
that Jim Demiris' responses to the doctor's questions would 
be of an automatic type and thus the doctor probably would 
observe nothing apparently abnormal. 
Dr. Diumenti admitted on cross-examination that Jim 
Demiris did not respond to all of his questions, refuting his 
earlier testimony that he appeared responsive. He was suffi· 
ciently concerned about Jim's condition to immediately refer 
him to a specialist and give a history used by the specialist 
in his treatment (R. 131 Ex. D-9). Even under the careful 
scrutiny of this medical specialist, .Mr. Demiris characteristically 
concealed his difficulties of mental coordinf1;tion, for Dr. 
Powell wrote to Dr. Diumenti on December 20, 1956: "On 
examination Mr. Demiris shows the slow cerebration and 
ready confusion of a senile person, although his speech and 
initial responsese would seem appropriate enough" (Ex. D-9). 
10 
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It is submitted that the defendant herself was the best 
witness as to the progress of her husband's disease. While at 
the trial she recalled nothing had been wrong with her husband 
except for difficulties with his eyes and legs prior to his 
treatment by Dr. Powell on December 18th, (R. 81) her 
statements to both Dr. Powell on December 18th and Dr. Phil 
Howard on December 1st are in direct contradiction to this 
testimony. She told Dr. Howard about her husband's con-
fusion, forgetfulness and wanderings prior to December 1st 
(R. 164). On December 18th she was in a highly emotional 
state because of her concern about ·her husband's condition, 
and at that time emphatically described the symptoms that 
her husband had evidenced over a period of months, and told 
the doctor that he had "gotten bad three weeks before" (T. 
130, 151) . These statements made by her prior to litigation, 
when she was concerned about Jim's health, are highly credible 
and substantiate completely the statement by Dr. Powell as 
to her husband's incompetency on December 18th, and that 
such incompetency had occurred some one to four months 
before (R. 150). 
The defendant's actions in hurriedly withdrawing all of 
the cash in the bank accounts and cashing in 69 U. S. Savings 
Bonds of a value of $9,700.00 (Ex. P-22) immediately after 
her husband was hospitalized in an incompetent state, together 
with her questioning of Frank Vleck and Alke Diamant about 
Jim's bank accounts (R. 121, 221-222) and then denying 
doing so (R. 104), are highly suspicious circumstances, in-
dicative of bad faith and over-reaching. The substantial 
evidence of independent witnesses who testified that Jim 
Demiris on numerous occasions represented that he desired 
11 
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his brothers and sisters to share in his estate, together with the 
facts that his life with his wife was very unhappy and when-
ever he had independent advice regarding his affairs he included 
his relaitves in the disposition of his estate, establishes by 
compelling evidence that his wife exerted pressure and undue 
influence upon him in obtaining control of substantially all 
of his assets. 
Upon a review of the evidence of incompetency and undue 
influence, this court should conclude that the trial court was 
in. error in finding against appellants on both of these issues, 
thereby requiring a reversal of these findings. Such a reversal 
on either ground would recover the following bank accounts 
to the executor and enable the assets contained therein to be 
used to satisfy the deceased's bequests made in his Last Will 
and Testament: 
Ex P-17 American Savings & Loar't 
Ex P-13 Continental Bank & Trust Co. 
Ex P-14 State Savings & Loan 
Ex P-16 American Savings & Loan 





Appellants find it extremely difficult to reply to the 
respondent's answer to appellant's points III and IV, since 
respondent in her answer has merely repeated appellants' 
authorities, while ignoring or misreading appellants' position 
and reasoning in support thereof. It is appellants' position 
and reasoning that the conclusive presumption of Holt v. 
Bayles, 85 Utah 364, 39 Pac 2d 715, should be overruled, for 
the court in deciding this case went astray by following cases 
12 
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decided in states havin~ a statute c,reating a conclusive pre-
sumption and providing a form which will evoke this pre-
sumption. The Holt case, as poirted out by Justice Wade in 
Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah, 571, 212 Pac 2d 194, is irrecon-
cilable with the other Utah cases on bank accounts. It is 
respectfully submitted that in overruling the Holt case this 
courf would fall in line with the general rule that in the 
absence of a statutory provision establishing the rights of 
depositors between themselves, it is generally held that evidence 
presented as to the ownership of the fund must be considered 
in the light of common law principles under circumstances 
attending the deposit. (See Appellants' Brief, page 48 et seq.) 
If this court sees fit to overrule the Holt v. Bayles case, appel-
lants woud then be entitled at least to a new trial for the 
purpose of obviating the trial court's error in its application 
of a conclusive presumption as to the donative intent of James 
Demiris to all of the money in the joint bank accounts and 
the United States Government bonds. It would seem that the 
question of whether a new trial should be granted or the trial 
court's finding on the issues of donative intent reversed without 
the granting of a new trial, would depend upon the court's 
resolution of the burden of proof question raised by Justice 
Wade in Greener v. Greener, supra. Justice Wade in his 
special concurrence pointed out that the Greener case and 
the Holt case create a confusion of burdens of proof, with 
each side requiring clear and convincing evidence, since the 
monies in the bank account could only pass by virtue of a gift 
if th.ere is no consideration in the agreement of deposit. The 
clear and convincing proof required in all other gift situations 
is completly destroyed where the counterconclusive presumption 
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of the Holt case is applied (Appellants' Brief pages 46, 47; 
discussed, pages 51, 52.) 
If the burden of persuasion ultimately rests on the alleged 
donee, the defendant and respondent in this case, as it does in 
all other gift situations, or if the burden of going forward 
devolved upon the donee after presentation of evidence con-
trary to the intent expressed in the bank deposit cards, then 
the finding on the issue of donat.ive intent should be reversed, 
without the granting of a new trial, for the respondent Mrs. 
Demiris did not present evidence of a gift sufficient to permit 
a finding of donative intent. This court should then reverse 
the finding of the trial court and order judgment entered for 
appellant executor on the following bank accounts and bonds: 
Ex P-10 First Security Bank $ 6,841.99 
Ex P-12 Continental Bank 10,125.00 
Ex P-13 Continental Bank 10,125.00 
Ex P-14 State Savings & Loan 8,104.45 
Ex P-15 State Savings & Loan 10,000.00 
Ex P-16 American Savings & Loan 10,000.00 
Ex P-17 American Savings & Loan 10,175.00 
Ex P-22 U. S. Government Bonds 9,700.00 
There should be no question that all of the bonds should be 
given the executor for there is no bank account language here 
for the respondent to rely upon. While Ex. P-22 indicates the 
bonds were "Series E" payable to "Mr. James Demiris or Mrs. 
I phegenia Demeris,'' there was no such bond introduced or 
any evidence of the language thereof. All respondent presented 
concerning the bonds was that she was in Greece when Jim 
bought them; he wrote her that he was putting her name on 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
them; and that she cashed them while Jim was in the hospital 
(R. 105). Respondent did not prove a gift as to the U. S. 
bonds. 
If on the other hand this court should hold that the 
burden lies with appellants under any circumstances, appel-
lants submit that they have sufficiently met that burden and 
are entitled to judgment as to all of the money in all of the 
accounts. The evidence outlined by the appellants under Point 
IV of their brief is substantial and compelling and should 
require the finding that no gift was intended to be made in any 
of these accounts by James Demiris to the respondent. If 
this court is reluctant to find, in view of the finding of the 
trial court, that the appellants' burden was met, then a new 
trial should be ordered as to the portions of the judgment 
upon which appellants did not prevail, involving the Govern-
ment bonds and the bank accounts enumerated in the preceding 
paragraph. This would be required if Holt v. Bayles is over-
ruled, because the appellants were hampered in making their 
proof in the eyes of the trial court by its erroneous application 
of a conclusive presumption in favor of the respondent as 
joint owner of the bank accounts. 
The respondent in her brief has sought to evade the very 
difficult problem of burden of proof in a gift situation by 
stating that "the problem is not confined to a question of gift, 
but involves a question of whether there was an intention to 
create a survivorship or joint tenancy relationship" (Respond-
ent's Brief, pages 53 and 54). The fallacy of this reasoning 
is pointed out in the quotations from L.R.A. and Am. Jur. on 
page 49 of appellant's brief. Furthermore, by respondent's 
assertions and admissions in her brief on page 4, she makes 
I) 
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no claim to any of the money that she acquired from the bank 
accounts except through purported "gifts in contemplation 
of death." Furthermore such contention is not applicable to 
the Government Bonds where there is only apparent co-owner-
ship by being payable to A or B, which according to Greener 
v. Greener, supra, does not establish survivorship or joint 
ownership. 
POINTV 
Under Point V the respondent confuses the issue by in-
timating that the Continental Bank cards contain words grant-
ing a survivorship interest (Respondent's brief, page 57). 
This is not true, and an inspection of these cards which were 
introduced into evidence by the court will show that there is 
mere! y a provision that the bank may pay to the survivor (See 
Ex. P-12 and P-13). While it is true that a joint tenancy may 
be created by the use of such words as "joint tenancy," "with 
rights of survivorship," or without them, as provided by statute 
and the cases cited by respondent at pages 57, 58 and 59 of 
her brief, there must, however, be some demonstration that 
an interest shall pass. Respondent overlooks the fact that the 
bank account cards are merely evidence of the gift. In Colo-
rado Trust Company v. Anglum, 63 Utah 354, 225 Pac. 1089, 
evidence extrinsic with the card showing a joint ownership 
of funds; that the husband and wife jointly contributed and 
jointly owned the funds; and therefore it was found that 
rights of survivorship follow the agreement of the parties. 
Contrast this situation with the present case where respondent 
relies solely upon the presumption created by the joint deposit 
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card, the language of which demonstrates no intention to give 
or agreement by the parties to hold jointly. Also cited by 
respondent as favoring presumption on these two cards in 
her favor is Neill v. Royce, 101 Utah 181, 120 Pac 2d, 327, 
but involved in that case was a card which clearly stated that 
the funds were to be held jointly. The present case falls within 
the exception of Greener v. Greener. There is no difference in 
significance between "Pay A or B" and "Pay A or B or sur-
vivor." 
Respondent mttmates further that the appellants have 
waived their rights to rely upon the language of the Continental 
Bank cards by not stressing it during the pretrial and the 
trial. The respondent is of course in error, because by this 
assertion she is attempting to shift the burden of proof regard-
ing these gifts which she claims on to the appellants. Without 
the cards she has no claim to the money deposited under them. 
Upon introducing the cards she can claim only the gift of 
interest which the cards divulge. It is her burden, not the 
appellants', to produce valid, clear and convincing evidence 
of gift, whether by the bank deposit cards or otherwise. This 
she failed to do. Greener v. Greener held "If there is no 
agreement between the parties which has been reduced to 
writing, the only documentary evidence being the form of the 
deposit (e.g. 'in account with A or B' with no provision con-
cerning survivorship), the intent of the owner in converting 
the account to a joint one must be shown by extrinsic evidence 
as there is no presumption that a 'joint tenancy' or gift was 
intended." 
The authorization to the bank contained m the cards 
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permitted them to pay to "either of us or to the survivor of 
us," and that such payment will be a full acquittance and dis-
charge of the bank, does nothing more than the language of 
the deposit in the Greener cards, "in account with A or B," 
which again would authorize the bank to pay to either A or 
B with impugnity, and thus the funds in the two Continental 
Bank deposits, amounting to $20,250.00, should go to the 
estate of the deceased to perform his wishes expressed in his 
last will and testament. 
POINT VI 
It is curious to note that respondent attempts to rely upon 
the elements of joint tenancy common to real estate trans-
actions in arguing Point V, but in Point VI ignores the ques-
tion of unities necessary to the creation of a joint tenancy, and 
scoffs at the New Jersey-Pennsylvania rule as to the effects 
of severance by the withdrawal by one of the depositors. The 
rule of Steinmetz v. Steinmetz, 130 N.J. Eq. 176, 21 Atl. 2d 
743, that the wife's withdrawal of all moneys in the accounts 
while the husband was alive and insane, destroyed the joint 
tenancy, and that she then became a tenant in common of 
the funds to the extent of her presumed one-half interest, 
holding the other half share as agent or trustee for her husband, 
we submit is based upon sound legal rationale. Clearly the 
withdrawal destroyed the unities of ownership, interest, and 
title, and thus severed and extinguished the joint estate. The 
adoption by this court of the Steinmetz rule would permit 
recov~ry by the appellant executor of one-half of the money 
contained in the following accounts: 
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Ex P-17 $10,175.00 
Ex P-13 10,125.00 
Ex P-14 8,104.45 
Ex P-15 10,000.00 
Ex P-10 6,841.99 
Ex P-12 10,125.00 
Ex P-22 9,700.00 
Appellants do not quarrel with the respondent's inter-
pretation of Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N.Y. 380, 167 U.E. 
506, A.L.R. 871, but wish to point out that in that case the 
New York court held that even where there was a conclusive 
presumption created by statute of a joint tenancy, that such 
presumption is not conclusive with respect to any moneys with-
drawn prior to the death of one of the depositors. As the 
appellants were met at the trial of this case with· the erroneous 
conclusive presumption created by Holt v. Bayles, supra, the 
trial court did not consider the evidence in their favor as is 
permitted even where, as in New York, a conclusive presump-
tion is a part of the state's statutory law. Thus, even if the court 
should not adopt the rule of Steinmetz, which we submit 
is a sound case on all four's with the case before this court, 
but rather adopts the conclusions of the New York court, 
the appellants would still be entitled to a new trial as to those 
portions of the judgment in the respondent's favor because 
of the effect of Holt v. Bayles, supra. 
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ANSWER TO CROSS APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS FINDING 
THAT THE TRUST ACCOUNT AT AMERICAN SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION IN THE NAME OF JAMES 
DEMIRIS, TRUSTEE FOR IPHEGENIA DEMIRIS FOR 
$10,000.00 FAILED FOR WANT OF DONATIVE INTENT 
AND FAILED TO CREATE A TENANCY IN COMMON. 
It is fundamental Hornbook law that no gift in a bank 
account of either the legal or equitable title can be made with-
nqt donative intent. 
'' . . . the intention of the depositor controls in de-
termining whether or not a trust has been created . . . 
No trust is created in the absence of such intention 
or if the intention is not given effect. Usually, in decid-
ing as to the existence of a trust, including the intention 
of the depositor, the surrounding facts and circum-
stances are considered in connection with the acts and 
declarations of the depositor, and the question is de-
termined as one of fact and not of law." 89 C.J.S., 
Trusts, Sec. 54; Buteau v. Lavalle, 284 Mass. 276, 
187 N.E. 628. 
" . . . while the fact that the deposit is in form in 
trust for one other than the depositor is some proof 
of intention and entitled to consideration, or raises a 
presumption of an intention to create a trust, and 
may control in the absence of countervailing circum-
stances : . . the fact that the depositor is designated 
as trustee for another is not necessarily controlling or 
conclusive and will not prevail where there is an ab-
sence of an intention to create a trust, as shown by the 
declartaion of the depositor and the surrounding cir-
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cumstances." 89 C.J.S., Trusts, Section 54; Wasserman 
v. C.I.R., 139 F.2d 778; Hogarth-Swann vs. Steele, 
294 Mass. 396, 2 N.E. 2d 446; Robertson v. Parker, 
287 Mass. 351, 191 N.E. 645; Boyer v. Backus, 282 
Mich. 593, 276 N.W. 564; Haux v. Dry Dock Savings 
Inst., 37 N.Y.S. 917, 2 App. Div. 165, aff'd 49 N.E. 
1097; A.L.I. Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Sec-
tions 2~ and 24. 
In Christensen v. Ogden State Bank, 75 Utah 478, 286 
Pacific 638, at Page 643, this Court said: 
" . . . the donor must intend that either the legal or 
equitable title to the fund shall pass to the donee. The 
intention must be that some title to the account shall 
pass during the life of the donor otherwise the gift 
must fail unless the requirements of the law as to 
testamentary dispositions of property have been com-
plied with.'' 
Although the trial court found that this account was a re-
vocable trust, it is apparent that this was a mere designation 
of the account following the language of the instrument itself, 
for the court further found no donative intent and decreed that 
this account should belong to the estate of the deceased. The 
finding was clearly supported by "the evidence as below out-
lined. 
A. Only the front side of the trust account card was 
signed by James Demiris (Exhibit P-16). This signed portion 
respondent admits merely recited that the account was in the 
name of James Demiris, trustee for Iphegenia Demiris. The 
terms of the trust or the so-called trust agreement are found 
on the reverse side of the card with another signature line 
at the end thereof for the grantor to sign upon. This trust 
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agreement was n,ever signed by James Demiris, the grantor. 
Therefore, as there was no additional evidence in the record 
with respect to this trust account, no trust can be said to have 
been created. This is much the same situation as was found 
in Woods v. Woods, 87 Utah 394, 49 Pacific (2d) 416, where 
this Court at Page 419 said: 
"The Courts have generally held that a savings 
account in the name of a third party by the depositor'}; 
as trustee or in the name of the depositor, as trustee for · 
a third party is not sufficient, standing alone, to estab-
lish a trust and is insufficient to constitute a gift during 
the life time of the depositor. 
"It thus seems that the form of the act standing 
alone, by the great weight of authority, is not sufficient 
to show an intention to create a trust or prove a gift 
of the money. Other corrobative evidence is essential." 
It is to be noted that this rule is also applicable to the 
"Totten Trust" cases relied upon by the respondent in her 
brief for these cases all recite the trust terms that were clearly 
provided for in connection with the trust account upon which 
the Courts relied to establish the intent of the donor in creat-
ing the trust. There are no such provisions jn this case nor 
other corroborative evidence that can be relied upon to estab-
lish intent. 
B. It is obvious from the form of the account card that 
in order to incorporate the terms of the trust agreement printed 
on the back, it would be necessary for the grantor to sign on 
the line provided for his signature under the said trust agree-
ment. However, if such trust terms shoudl be considered in· 
corporated by reference as respondent apparently contends, 
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:he result woudl be one which neither Mr. Demiris nor Mrs. 
Demiris intended. It is provided in the trust agreement 
"if the age of the beneficiary is not specified (and 
it was not specified) this trust is f_pr the life of said 
beneficiary and six months . . . (and) "the funds in 
said trust account shall be the property of the estate 
of said beneficiary." 
Respondent's brief confesses that the major concern of the 
deceased in making his wills and in refusing to go back to 
Greece was the fear that Mrs. Demiris' family (who would 
inherit from her estate) would poison him for his money. 
C. The money of this account was necessary to perform 
the bequests of his will. Since a Totten trust may be revoked 
by provisions of a will, A.L.I. Restatement of Trusts, Section 
58, Comment b., the previous settlement of his estate by will 
would appear to have some bearing on his intention to again 
dispose of the same money. 
D. The evidence of the relationship of the parties, the 
time of the change in the names on deposit, the numerous 
expressions of intent by the deceased to provide for his sisters 
and brothers cited at length by appellants in their first brief, 
support the finding of the trial court that Mr. Demiris did not 
intend to give, by trust, or otherwise, the money in this account 
to his wife. 
E. Respondent as the donee had the burden of proving 
the gift of this allege4 trust account by clear and convincing 
evidence. Wood v. Wood, supra; Christensen v. Ogden State 
Bank, 75 Utah 478, 286 P. 638. The presumptions provided 
by the Courts in the joint account cases such as Holt v. Bayles, 
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supra, Greener v. Greener, supra, and Neill v. Royce, 101 Utah 
181, 120 Pacific (2d) 327, which shift the burden from the 
donee would not apply to this trust account which was created 
by a card signed only by James Demiris, the donor. These 
joint account cases hold the presumption arises that a joint 
tenancy was intended because both parties sign a joint account 
card purporting to establish rights between them, and thereby 
enter into a contract which is binding on the Court. Such 
reasoning is obviously not applicable to a card signed by 
only the donor. A review of the evidence shows the respondent 
completely failed to meet her burden of proving a gift to her of 
this trust account. 
F. This Court has never, so far as we can determine, passed 
directly upon the tentative trusts of savings bank deposits which 
are frequently called "Totten Trusts." In Volume I, Scott on 
Trusts, Section 58.3, the author on Page 484 reports that while 
the New York Courts, which initiated this doctrine, speak as 
though no trust arises until the death of the depositor, what 
is really meant is that a trust is created at the time of the 
deposit which is revocable in whole or in part by the depositor, 
being this, 
"subject to a condition subsequent of revocation 
rather than to a condition precedent of the death of I 
the depositor. Even so, in view of the extent of the 
control of the depositor over the deposit, the trust, in 
substance, appears to be testamentary. It is clear that 
a similar trust of property other than savings bank 
deposits would be invalid.'' 
Scott indicates that because this is a convenient method of 
disposing of comparatively small sums of money there seems 
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T 
to be no strong public policy to invalidate these trusts. Whert>, 
as in this case, the sum involved is not small, and there was 
a will which disposed of a substantial estate it would seem 
that the Court should be slow in embracing this principle and 
then only where all of the requirements are. clearly met. Boyle 
v. Dinsdale, 45 Utah 112, 153 P. 136, was the only Utah case 
relied upon by the respondent. This case does not support 
the Totten Trust principle at all. It involved a present gift 
in trust with enjoyment postponed until the death of the 
donor rather than a revocable trust and the Court indicated that 
if the gift in trust had been testamentary, it would have been 
struck down. Thus, it appears to be an expression of this 
Court contrary to the principle of the Totten cases. 
Assuming, however, for the sake of argument that the 
Totten doctrine applies in Utah, as claimed by respondent, 
the rule in re Totten, 179 New York, 112, 71 N.E. 748, is: 
"In case the depositor dies before the beneficiary 
without revocation or some decisive act or declaration 
of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that an abso-
lute trust was created as to the balance on hand at 
the death of the depositor." 
The doctrine has no application to the instant case. The tria] 
court held that any presumption was overcome by evidence 
showing that no trust was intended. The function of the 
Totten doctrine is to put the donor's intention into effect even 
though in substance this is a testamentary disposition contrary 
to law because of the donor's retention of control during his 
lifetime. Here the trial court found the donor had no intention 
to give an interest. For all of the foregoing reasons the action 
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of the trial court in awarding this trust account to the executor 
should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING 
THE COUNTERCLAIM OF THE DEFENDANT, THERE-
BY AWARDING THE BALANCE DUE JAMES DEMIRIS 
ON THE ELMER BUTLER NOTE AND MORTGAGE TO 
THE EXECUTOR. 
Appellants respectfully submit that the counterclaim of 
the defendant and respondent in this matter was without 
merit, and in support of this position direct the court's attention 
to three instruments, their inter-relation and the law applicable 
thereto. These instruments are: 
(A) The promissory note of Elmer Butler and Minerva 
Anne Butler in the sum of $54,300.00, executed November 
28, 2949, payable to James Demiris, pursuant to the terms 
and conditions thereof, with payments to be made at the First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., Exchange Place Branch, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, (referred to in Ex. P-1). 
(B) The letter of December 23, 1949 addressed to First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., signed by James Demiris. Among , 
I 
other provisions, James Demiris instructed First Security Bank j 
of Utah, N.A. "to collect from Elmer Butler and Minerva 
Anne Butler payments due or to become due under the 
[November 28, 1949) note and mortgage and to divide the 
moneys so received once a month * * * * "pursuant to a 
formula spelled out in the instrument. James Demiris agreed 
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to pay to First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., the sum of 
$3.00 per month for its services in collecting and paying. This 
letter of instructions provides: 11ft is further understood and 
agreed that the undersigned may, at his option, revoke this 
agreement at any time he so desires, providing that the under-
signed has paid to First Security Bank of Utah the amounts 
due them for their services hereunder." This instrument and 
offer was accepted the 27th day of December, 1949, by First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. (Exhibit P-1). 
(C) The December 10 ,1956 letter directed to the First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A.: "Gentlemen: With respect to 
the account you are collecting from Mr. Elmer Butler, we the 
undersigned, hereby express our desire to have the portion 
heretofore sent to Mr. James Demiris made out to the below 
named individuals: James Demiris or Iphegenia Demiris." This 
instrument (Exhibit D-20) was signed by James and Iphegenia 
Demiris. 
The position of appellants in this matter is that this 
letter of December 10, 1956, has no legal significance what-
soever, or viewed in the light most favorable to defendants, 
is a letter of instructions from a principal to his agent, and 
all power thereunder terminated on the death of the principal. 
In support of such conclusion, we reason as follows: 
1. The instruction of 10 December 1956 at most denotes 
. or creates a relationship between the First Security Bank and 
:James Demiris. It is not a contract between the signers, nor 
, does it indicate a relationship as between them. Its effect 
, runs between the bank and James Demir is, since it bears 
·.upon the relationship already existing between those parties. 
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2. The instrument of 10 December 1956 uses the word 
"desire," which is precatory in nature and has no legal sig-
nificance; it conveys no estate. According to the general rule, 
"desire" has no legal effect except in the case of wills, where 
extrinsic evidence may show a legal obligation. See also Desire, 
26 A. CJS Desire, p. 866; Words and Phrases, Desire. 
3. The instrument of December 23, 1949 is in the form 
of a letter of instructions and offer by James Demiris, with 
an acceptance by the offeree as such instrument is nothing 
more or less than a contract for the performance of certain 
services by the First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., and the 
promise on the part of James Demiris to pay a stated con-
sideration for said services. By the very terms of the contract 
it was revokable at the will of James Demiris. This instru~ 
ment cannot be construed as being a conveyance of any estate. 
The communication of December 10, 1956, directed to the 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., can only be read in relation 
to the contract of 27 December 1949, and by implication it 
refers to the latter. As such it constitutes a modification or 
amendment of the original letter of instruction. 
By the very terms of the December 27, 1949 agreement 
(Exhibit P-1) the contract of services could be revoked at 
will. The letter of instruction of December 10, 1956, would, 
of course, be subject to the same power to terminate. 
It is a well-established rule that the death of the principal 
terminates and revokes the authority of an agent by operation 
of law. 2 C.J.S., Agency, Sec. 86, page 1174. This rule applies 
even though the agency is in its terms irrevocable. (Ibid.) 
According to 2 Am. Jur. Agency, Section 59, p. 52: 
28 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"It is well established as the general rule that the 
death of the principal operates as an ins,tantaneous 
and absolute revocation of the agent's authority or 
power, unless the agency is one coupled with an in-
terest. Hence, any act done by the agent, as such, after 
the principal's death will not affect the estate of the 
latter.'' 
(See Halloran Judge Trust Co. v. Heath, 70 Utah 124, 258 
P. 342, 64 ALR 368.) 
"In order that a power may be irrevocable because coupled 
with an interest, it is necessary that the interest shall be in the 
subject matter of the power, and not in the proceeds which 
will arise from the exercise of the power." 2 Am. Jur., Agency, 
p. 62; Halloran Judge Trust Co. v. Heath, supra. 
As a matter of law the counterclaim was properly dis-
missed with prejudcie, and judgment awarded plaintiff. The 
instrument of 10 December 1956 is a letter expressing a 
"wish" of a principal to his agent, or considered most favorable 
to defendant, nothing more than a direction of a principal to 
his agent, and its legal effect terminated by the death of the 
principal. 
The 10 December 1956 instrument is not an assignment. 
It is a general rule of law that the assignor must not retain 
any control over the fund or interest assigned, any power to 
collect, or any power of revocation. In the case of Purman' s 
Estate, 56 A. 2d 86, 175 A.L.R. 1129, "Assignment" is de-
fined as follows: 
" * * * a legal assignment is 'a transfer or setting 
over of property, or of some right or interest therein, 
from one person to another, and unless in some way 
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qualified, it is properly the transfer of one whole in-
terest in an estate, chattel, or other thing' 
* * * * 
"On the other hand, an equitable assignment is 
'Any order, writing, or act by the assignor which makes 
an absolute appropriation of a chose in action or fund 
to the use of the assignee with the intention to transfer 
a present interest, although not amounting to a legal 
assignment ... ' See * CJS, Assignments, § 58. In such 
a situation, the assignor must not retain any control 
over the fund, any authority to collection, or any power 
of revocation. 4 Am Jur 288, Section 76." 
In the case at bar there is no loss of control or transfer 
of an interest. Whatever "authority" is granted First Security 
Bank of Utah, N.A., it is to make checks payable in the dis-
junctive to James Demiris or Iphegenia Demiris. There is no 
relinquishment of a power to collect or retention of control 
of the chose in question by the original payee of the note. 
James Demiris not only retained power to "revoke" instruc-
tions to the Bank, he had the control of the funds since the 
method of making the checks evidencing collection of payments 
under the note and mortgage was the only change, there 
being no instrument conveying an interest from James Demiris 
to Iphegenia Demiris. The 10 December 1956 letter runs 
from the signing parties to the Bank; on its face it consti· 
tutes no contract or agreement of assignment between the 
signers. The instrument does not constitute a conveyance or 
assignment by its very wording. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that a gift was 
made or a contract formed between the Demiris'. Mrs. Demiris, 
claiming a gift, has the burden of showing all the elements of 
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that gift by clear and convmcmg evidence. The letter of 
December 10, 1956, upon which she bases her claim, will . 
not support even an inference of donative intent, much less 
create a presumption. All the evidence introduced indicates that 
no gift was intended. Mr. Long's testimony shows that Mr. 
Demiris' intention was one of business convenience only, and 
provided for the contingency that his illness would make him 
unable to handle his affairs. The formal assignments that 
James Demiris made to each of his brothers (Exhibits 2 and 3) 
of a portion of the interest in the note and mortgage show 
clearly that Jim Demiris knew how to make a conveyance 
of an interest in this chose of action, and further indicates 
that he did not intend to do so as to Mrs. Demiris. 
The cross-appellant sets forth three theories upon which 
she relies~· The case of Boyle v. Dinsdale relied on for theory 
( 1) is not applicable because in that case a deposit in a bank 
account was made· payable to either one or two persons under 
such circumstances as to indicate a completed gift in trust 
to the payees. Columbia Trust Company v. Anglum, relied on 
in theory ( 2) , again is not in point, for this was another 
deposit in a bank account, where both parties owned and 
contributed money, and ti?.e court found a joint tenancy. The 
statement _under this theory that Mr. Demiris said he wanted 
.his wife to have the money if he got sick is a misrepresentation 
of the evidence. What Mr. Demir is said, according to Mr . 
. Long, was: "He said he would like her to be able to cash the 
check in case he was sick or somehing she could cash it and 
have some money" (R. 323). Theory (3) is that this letter of 
:instruction constituted an assignment, relying on the case of 
Thatcher v. Merriam, 121 Utah 191, 240 P 2d. 266. This 
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Merriam case does not in any way support the counterclaim, 
for the language in the assignment there was very clear and 
specific. (See page 268) . 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the 
trial court in awarding to the executor Trust Account No. 
0-6635 with American Savings and Loan Association, and 
dismissing the defendant's counterclaim for the interest of 
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